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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) DISCUSSIONS, OCTOBER 12-14, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator
. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-004.

¶2. (U) Meeting Dates: October 12 and 14, 2009
Times: 6:00 - 8:00 p.m.; 1:00 - 2:30 p.m.
Place: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Osobnyak,
Moscow

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) During two receptions - October 12 and October 14 - members of the U.S. and Russian delegations to the START Follow-on Negotiations held informal conversations on missile defense, conventionally armed missiles, and unanswered Russian concerns in the START Follow-on negotiations. End Summary

Missile Defense

¶4. (S) During the reception on October 12 at the MFA Osobnyak, Vladimir Yermakov of the MFA said to U.S. SFO delegation member Trout that President Obama provided a very clever way to continue to do what the previous administration wanted to do - that is putting a missile defense system into Poland. This plan provides the United States the ability to put more missile defense capability into Poland than

previously planned at a time, only a little later than the Bush administration had scheduled. This new flexible, adaptive, and phased approach is another way to cover up the fact that the U.S. continues to expand its global missile defense systems. That is why Russia needs to have clauses in the START Follow-on treaty about the expansion of U.S. missile defense and the relationship between offensive and defense strategic forces.

Conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs

¶ 15. (S) While discussing conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs, Yermakov said to Trout that Russia would never accept JDEC as long as the U.S. insisted on having conventional warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs. JDEC would seem to imply that Russia accepted the U.S. proposal that the U.S. would notify Russia prior to or simultaneous with the launch of a conventionally armed ICBM or SLBM. Yermakov initially said Russia would never accept non-nuclear armed ICBMs or SLBMs. When asked was there any circumstance that Russia would accept non-nuclear armed ICBMs or SLBMs, Yermakov said that if non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs were limited to only a few missiles, than Russia could consider that approach.

¶ 16. (S) Sergey Luchaninov of the Federal Security Service asked U.S. SFO delegation legal adviser Brown during the reception on October 14 at the MFA Osobnyak whether the U.S. side had understood Antonov's point concerning the proliferation implications of long-range missiles, based on

the U.S. position that non-nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs would not count under the START Follow-on Treaty. He claimed that this would be perceived by the NAM as contributing to the arms race between the United States and Russia, and would encourage other countries to develop such systems.

Russian concerns not being addressed

¶ 17. (S) Yermakov said to Trout that Russia felt like it had provided the U.S. with its concerns but the U.S. was not responding to those concerns. In particular, President Medvedev had said the U.S. had to leave Votkinsk, but the U.S. has continued to insist on staying at the facility.

¶ 18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
Beyrle